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Abstract
In this paper, we study physical adversarial attacks on
object detectors in the wild. Prior arts on this matter mostly
craft instance-dependent perturbations only for rigid and
planar objects. To this end, we propose to learn an ad-
versarial pattern to effectively attack all instances belong-
ing to the same object category (e.g., person, car), referred
to as Universal Physical Camouflage Attack (UPC). Con-
cretely, UPC crafts camouflage by jointly fooling the region
proposal network, as well as misleading the classifier and
the regressor to output errors. In order to make UPC ef-
fective for articulated non-rigid or non-planar objects, we
introduce a set of transformations for the generated cam-
ouflage patterns to mimic their deformable properties. We
additionally impose optimization constraint to make gen-
erated patterns look natural for human observers. To fairly
evaluate the effectiveness of different physical-world attacks
on object detectors, we present the first standardized vir-
tual database, AttackScenes, which simulates the real 3D
world in a controllable and reproducible environment. Ex-
tensive experiments suggest the superiority of our proposed
UPC compared with existing physical adversarial attackers
not only in virtual environments (AttackScenes), but also
in real-world physical environments. Codes, models, and
demos are publicly available at https://mesunhlf.
github.io/index_physical.html.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved outstand-
ing performances on many computer vision tasks [34, 9,
11]. Nonetheless, DNNs have been demonstrated to be vul-
nerable to adversarial examples [35] — maliciously crafted
inputs that mislead DNNs to make incorrect predictions,
which present potential threats for the deployment of DNN-
based systems in the real world.
Different adversarial attacks have been proposed re-
cently [25, 3], which can be divided into the following cat-
egories: 1) digital attacks, which mislead DNNs by modi-
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Figure 1. Fooling the object detector, faster r-cnn, in the digi-
tal&physical space. (a) Different digital attacks. (b)&(c) Physical
attacks (UPC) in virtual scenes and real world. Column 1 shows
detection results with natural patterns. Column 2-4 display results
with camouflage patterns under different viewing conditions.
fying the input data directly in the digital space (e.g., pixel
value [25, 12, 22], text content [16, 29], voice signal [4, 1]);
2) physical attacks, which attack DNNs by altering the
characteristics of an object (e.g., color [30], appearance [8])
in the physical world. Examples of both digital and physi-
cal attacks are shown in Fig. 1. Current mainstream works
of adversarial machine learning focus on the digital domain,
which can be hardly transferred to the real world due to the
lack of considering physical constraints (e.g., invariant to
different environmental conditions such as viewpoint, light-
ing) [8]. In this paper, we study adversarial attacks in the
physical world, which are more threatening to real-world
computer vision systems [15]. While previous works in this
category [13, 2] mostly focus on attacking image classifi-
cation systems, we consider the far more realistic computer
vision scenario, i.e., object detection.
Though prior works have revealed the vulnerability of
object detectors to adversarial perturbations in the real
world, e.g., [5, 33] generate perturbed stop signs, there are
several limitations: (1) these algorithms focus on only at-
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tacking a specific object (e.g. a stop sign [8, 5] or a commer-
cial logo [32]); (2) existing methods generate perturbations
only for rigid and planar objects (e.g., traffic sign, wall,
board), which can be less effective for complex objects (ar-
ticulated non-rigid or non-planar objects, e.g., human); (3)
the generated perturbations lack semantics [5], which can
be unnatural for human observers; and (4) a unified eval-
uation environment is missing, which makes it difficult to
make fair comparisons between different physical attacks.
To address these issues, we present Universal Physi-
cal Camouflage Attack (UPC), which constructs a univer-
sal camouflage pattern to hide objects from being detected
or to misdetect objects as the target label. Unlike former
works which generate instance-level perturbations, UPC
constructs a universal pattern to attack all instances that
belong to the same object category (e.g., person, cars) via
jointly attacking the region proposal network, as well as
misleading the classifier and the regressor to output errors.
To efficiently handle the deformations of complex objects
in the physical world, we propose to model their inter-
nal deformable characteristics as well as external physical
environments in our framework. Specifically, the internal
properties are simulated by applying different geometric
transformation functions (e.g., cropping, resizing, affine ho-
mography). We impose additional optimization constraint
(Eq. 1) to encourage the visual resemblance between gen-
erated patterns and natural images, which we refer to as
semantic constraint. As shown in Fig. 1, these generated
camouflage patterns are visually similar to natural image
patterns and thus can be regarded as texture patterns on ob-
ject surfaces such as human accessories/car paintings. The
overall pipeline is illustrated in Fig. 2. Extensive exper-
iments suggest that the camouflage patterns generated by
UPC can be effectively applied to both virtual scenes and
the real physical world.
To fairly evaluate the effectiveness of different physical
attacks, we provide the first standardized synthetic dataset,
i.e., AttackScenes, which includes 20 virtual scenes. All
experimental data is generated under strict parametric-
controlled physical conditions (e.g., lighting or viewpoints)
to ensure that the evaluation comparison is reliable and
reproducible under virtual settings. Our proposed UPC
achieves state-of-the-art results among all existing methods.
The contributions of our work are four-fold:
• Unlike prior works which craft instance-level adver-
sarial patterns, UPC constructs a universal camouflage
pattern for effectively attacking object detectors based
on the fact that the generated pattern can be natu-
rally camouflaged as texture patterns on object sur-
faces such as human accessories/car paintings (Fig. 1).
• We present the first standardized dataset, At-
tackScenes, to ensure that all experiments are con-
ducted under fair comparisons. AttackScenes simu-
lates the real 3D world under controllable and repro-
ducible settings, which enables fair evaluation stan-
dards for future research in this domain.
• To make UPC effective for articulated non-rigid or
non-planar objects, we introduce additional transfor-
mations for the camouflage patterns to simulate their
internal deformations.
• Extensive experiments suggest that UPC not only gen-
erates effective camouflage patterns for attacking ob-
ject detectors in the wild, but also exhibits well gener-
alization and transferability among different models as
well as different datasets.
2. Related Works
Universal Adversarial Attack. Unlike generating image-
dependent adversarial perturbations [25, 12, 3], the image-
agnostic attack, i.e., universal adversarial attack [24, 14],
is defined as an attack which is able to fool different im-
ages with a single global pattern in the digital domain. Here
we extend this definition to the physical domain and de-
fine instance-agnostic perturbations as universal physical
attacks for object detectors. Unlike former physical attack
methodologies which craft instance-level patterns, our goal
is to generate a single camouflage pattern to effectively at-
tack all instances of the same object category given different
physical scenes.
Physical Attacks. Stem from the recent observation that
printed adversarial examples can fool image classifiers in
the physical world [15, 13], efforts have been investigated
to study how to construct “robust” adversarial examples in
the real physical world. For instance, Athalye et al. [2] pro-
pose to construct 3D adversarial objects by attacking an en-
semble of different image transformations; Sharif et al. [30]
successfully attack facial recognition systems by printing
textures on eyeglasses; Evtimov et al. [8] use poster, sticker
and graffiti as perturbations to attack stop signs in the phys-
ical world. Zeng et al. [37] apply computer graphics render-
ing methods to perform attacks in the 3D physical world.
These aforementioned works focus on fooling image
classifiers in physical environments. Recently, physical
attacks have also been studied for the more challenging
scenario of object detection. Song et al. [33] propose a
disappearance and creation attack to fool Yolov2 [26] in
traffic scenes. Chen et al. [5] adopt the expectation over
transformation method [2] to create more robust adversarial
stop signs, which mislead faster r-cnn [28] to output errors.
However they cannot be effectively applied to non-rigid or
non-planar objects since they only focus on simulating ex-
ternal environment conditions, e.g., distances or viewpoints,
for attacking object detectors. In addition, these approaches
generate instance-dependent patterns which exhibit less se-
mantics and therefore the perturbed images are usually un-
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Figure 2. a) UPC Training framework in Digital Space. UPC first generates initial RPN patterns to reduce the number of valid candidate
proposals, and then decreases the confidence scores of top-k proposals as well changes the corresponding predict labels. T indicates the
physical simulations, e.g., brightness adjustment, used in UPC. b) Attacking in Physical Space. The generated camouflage patterns by
UPC are painted on several pre-defined regions on human accessories (e.g., garment) for attacking (details are illustrated in Fig. 4). The
corresponding physical scenes are captured via different viewing conditions for testing.
Table 1. Comparison with existing methods.
Methods Rigid Non-Rigid Planar Non-Planar Universal Semantic
[5] X X
[33] X X
Ours X X X X X X
natural and noisy. Different from these works, our method
constructs a universal semantic pattern which makes the
perturbed images visually similar to natural images. Mean-
while, we introduce additional transformations to simulate
the deformable properties of articulated non-rigid or non-
planar objects. A detailed comparison with former methods
is summarized in Table. 1.
3. Methodology
3.1. Overview
Our goal is to attack object detectors by either hiding the
object from being detected, or fooling detectors to output
the targeted label. Without loss of generality, we use “per-
son” category as an example to illustrate our method.
Training framework of UPC in Digital Space. We attack
faster-rcnn [28], a two-stage detector, in this paper. In the
first stage, the region proposal network is employed to gen-
erate object proposals. In the second stage, the detector se-
lects top-scored proposals to predict labels. We propose to
craft a universal pattern for faster-rcnn by jointly fooling the
region proposal network to generate low-quality proposals,
i.e., reduce the number of valid proposals, as well as mis-
leading the classifier and the regressor to output errors. Sim-
ply misleading predictions of the classification head cannot
produce satisfying results (discussed in Sec. 5.2) because
it can be impractical to attack enormous candidate propos-
als simultaneously. Extensive experimental results also val-
idate that the joint attack paradigm demonstrates stronger
attacking strength than simply attacking the classifier as in
prior methods [5, 8] (Table 3). Furthermore, to deal with
complex objects, we propose to simultaneously model both
internal deformable properties of complex objects and ex-
ternal physical environments. The internal attributes of ob-
jects, i.e., deformations, are simulated by a series of ge-
ometric transformations. As illustrated in Fig. 2(a), UPC
consists of 3 steps:
• Step 1. A set of perturbed images are synthesized
by simulating external physical conditions (e.g., view-
point) as well as internal deformations of complex ob-
jects. An additional optimization constraint is imposed
to make the generated patterns semantically meaning-
ful. (Sec. 3.2)
• Step 2. Initial adversarial patterns are generated by
attacking the RPN, which results in a significant drop
of high-quality proposals. (Sec. 3.3)
• Step 3. To enhance the attacking strength further, UPC
then jointly attacks RPN as well as the classification
and the bounding box regression head by lowering
the detection scores and distorting the bounding box.
(Sec. 3.4)
We perform these steps in an iterative manner until the ter-
mination criterion is satisfied, i.e., fooling rate is larger than
the threshold or the attacking iteration reaches the maxi-
mum.
Attacking in Physical Space. By imposing the seman-
tic constraint (Sec. 3.2), the generated camouflage patterns
by UPC look natural for human observers and thus can be
regarded as texture patterns on human accessories. Con-
cretely, we pre-define several regions of human accessories
(e.g., garment, mask) to paint on the generated camouflage
patterns (Fig. 4) for attacking, and the corresponding phys-
ical scenes are captured under different viewing conditions
(e.g., illumination, viewpoints, distances, etc.) for testing
(Fig. 2(b)).
3.2. Physical Simulation
Material Constraint. To keep generated adversarial pat-
terns less noticeable, the perturbations are camouflaged
as texture patterns on human accessories (e.g., garment,
mask). External environments are simulated via controlling
factors such as lighting, viewpoint, location and angle [5, 8].
To effectively handle non-rigid or non-planar objects, we
also introduce addition transformation functions to model
their internal deformations (Eq. 2).
Semantic Constraint. Inspired by the imperceptibility
constraint in digital attacks, we use the projection func-
tion (Eq. 1) to enforce the generated adversarial patterns to
be visually similar to natural images during optimization.
Empirical results show that optimizing with this constraint
yields high-quality semantic patterns, which can be natu-
rally treated as camouflages on human clothing (Fig. 8).
Training Data. To obtain universal patterns, images with
different human attributes (body sizes, postures, etc.) are
sampled as the training set X .
In summary, the perturbed images are generated by:
δt = Proj∞(δt−1 + ∆δ, I, ), (1)
Xˆ = {xˆi|xˆi = Tr(xi + Tc(δt)), xi ∼ X} . (2)
Eq. 1 is the semantic constraint, where δt and ∆δ denote the
adversarial pattern and its updated vector at iteration t, re-
spectively. Proj∞ projects generated pattern onto the sur-
face of L∞ norm-balls with radius  and centered at I . Here
we choose I as natural images to ensure the generated cam-
ouflage patterns are semantically meaningful. Eq. 2 is the
physical simulation we applied during the attack, where Tr
is used for the environmental simulation (e.g., brightness
adjustment). Tc is used for modeling the material constraint
(e.g., deformations induced by stretching), and xˆ is the gen-
erated perturbed image (marked as blue in Fig. 2(a)).
3.3. Region Proposal Network (RPN) Attack
For an input image with height H and width W , the
RPN extracts M = O(HW ) proposals across all anchors.
We denote the output proposals of each image xˆ as P ={
pi|pi = (si, ~di); i = 1, 2, 3...M
}
, where si is the confi-
dence score of i-th bounding box and ~di represents the coor-
dinates of i-th bounding box. We define the objective func-
tion for attacking the RPN as following:
Lrpn = E
pi∼P
(L(si, yt) + si‖~di −∆~di‖p), (3)
where yt is the target score, and we set y1 for background
and y0 for foreground; L is the Euclidean distance loss; ∆~di
is used for attacking proposals by shifting the center coor-
dinate and corrupting the shape of original proposals; p is
the norm constant and we set p = 1 in the experiment.
By minimizing Lrpn, our goal is to generate adversar-
ial patterns for RPN which results in a substantial reduc-
tion of foreground proposals and severely distorted candi-
date boxes (marked as red in Fig. 2(a)).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of UPC
Require: A set of training images X ; Target Label yt; Balance
parameters λ1, λ2; Iteration parameters iters and itermax;
Fooling rate threshold rt;
Ensure: Universal adversarial pattern δ; Fooling rate r;
1: δ0 ← random, ∆δ ← 0
2: while t < itermax and r < rt do
3: δt ← Proj∞(δt−1 + ∆δ, I, )
4: for all xi ∼ X do
5: Choose the transformation of Tr and Tc randomly
6: xˆi = clip (Tr(xi + Tc(δ
t)), 0, 1)
7: end for
8: if t < iters and r < rt then
9: r = argmin
∆δ
E
xˆi∼Xˆ
Lrpn + Ltv
10: else
11: r = argmin
∆δ
E
xˆi∼Xˆ
(Lrpn + λ1Lcls + λ2Lreg) + Ltv
12: end if
13: t← t+ 1
14: end while
3.4. Classifier and Regressor Attack
After applying non-maximum suppression (NMS) on the
outputs of RPN, top-k proposals are ordered by their confi-
dence scores and selected as a subset P ′. These top-scored
proposals P ′ are then fed to the classification and the re-
gression head for generating final outputs. We note that if
only a subset of proposed bounding boxes are perturbed, the
detection result of the attacked image may still be correct if
a new set of candidate boxes is picked in the next iteration,
which results in great challenges for attackers. To overcome
this issue, we instead extract proposals densely as in [36].
Specifically, we attack an object by either decreasing the
confidence of the groundtruth label or increasing the confi-
dence of the target label. We further enhance the attacking
strength by distorting the aspect ratio of proposals and shift-
ing the center coordinate simultaneously [18]. In summary,
we attack the classification and the regression head by:
Lcls = E
p∼P′
[C(p)o + L
C(p)max∈o
(C(p), yt)], (4)
Lreg =
∑
C(p)max∈o
‖R(p)o −∆~d‖p, (5)
where L is the cross-entropy loss, C and R are the predic-
tion output of the classifier and the regressor, o is the true
label, t is the target label for attacking, and ∆~d denotes the
distortion offset. We select `2 norm, i.e., p = 2 in Eq. 5.
Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 are designed for fooling the classifier and
the regressor, respectively, and are referred to as C&R at-
tack (marked as green in Fig. 2(a)). For untargeted attack,
we set t = o for maximizing (instead of minimizing) Eq. 4.
detected as target labeldetected as correct label detected as others / undetectd
Figure 3. Examples of virtual scene experiments. Virtual scenes are shown in the first row, including indoors and outdoors environments.
The second rows shows results captured from various viewpoints using FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712.
3.5. Two-Stage Attacking Procedure
In summary, UPC generates the physical universal ad-
versarial perturbations by considering all the factors above:
argmin
∆δ
E
xˆ∼Xˆ
(Lrpn + λ1Lcls + λ2Lreg) + Ltv(δ
t), (6)
where δ and Xˆ denote the universal pattern and the set of
perturbed images, respectively. Ltv stands for the total
variation loss [23] with `2 norm constraint applied. We
note that Ltv is important for reducing noise and producing
more natural patterns.
The overall procedure of UPC is illustrated in Algo-
rithm 1, where we alternately update the universal pertur-
bation pattern δ and the perturbed images xˆ ∼ Xˆ until the
fooling rate becomes larger than a certain threshold or the
attack iteration reaches the maximum. δ is updated using
a two-stage strategy. During the first stage, we exclusively
attack the RPN to reduce the number of valid proposals,
i.e., set λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 0 in Eq. 6. After significantly
reducing the number of high-quality proposals, our attack
then additionally fools the classification and bounding box
regression head in the second stage. By minimizing Eq. 6,
the generated perturbation δ substantially lowers the quality
of proposals and thereby achieves a high fooling rate.
4. AttackScenes Dataset
Due to the lack of a standardized benchmark dataset, ear-
lier works measure the performance under irreproducible
physical environments, which makes it difficult to make
fair comparisons between different attacks. To this end, we
build the first standardized dataset, named AttackScenes,
for fair and reproducible evaluation.
Environments. AttackScenes includes 20 virtual scenes
under various physical conditions (Fig. 3). Specifically,
there are 10 indoors scenes (e.g., bathroom, living room)
and 10 outdoors scenes (e.g., bridge, public road, market)
in total.
Camera Setting. For each virtual scene, 18 cameras are
placed for capturing images from different viewpoints. To
Original Natural 3-Patterns 7-Patterns 8-PatternsNaive
Figure 4. Examples sampled from different pattern schemes in
the virtual scenes experiment. Original: humans without cam-
ouflage patterns; Naive: humans with simple camouflages (i.e.,
army camouflage cloths, pilot cap and snow goggles); Natural:
humans with natural images I from ImageNet [7] as camouflage
patterns. 3/7/8-Patterns: we pre-define 3/7/8 regions on human
accessories (e.g., garment) to paint on the camouflage patterns
generated by UPC.
ensure the diversity of images, these cameras are located at
different angles, heights and distances (Fig. 2(b)).
Illumination Control. To the best of our knowledge, the
experiments in earlier studies usually conduct tests in bright
environments. However, this simulated condition is quite
limited since there exist many dark scenes in the real world.
Accordingly, we extend the testing environment to differ-
ent levels of lighting conditions to better simulate different
daily times like evening, dusk and dawn. For indoor scenes,
area and sphere lights are used to simulate interior illumina-
tion. Meanwhile, we use directional light sources to simu-
late sunlight outdoors. The illumination varies from dark to
bright at 3 levels by controlling the strength of light sources
(i.e., L1∼L3).
5. Experiments
In this section, we empirically show the effectiveness
of the proposed UPC by providing thorough evaluations in
both virtual and physical environments. Our experiments
show that UPC can effectively attack proposal-based object
detectors in both virtual environments (AttackScenes) and
the physical world, and also exhibits well transferability to
other unknown models.
5.1. Implementation Details
We mainly evaluate the effectiveness of our method on
“person” category due to its importance in video surveil-
lance and person tracking [17]. We collect 200 human im-
ages with various attributes (e.g., hair color, body size) as
our training set to generate universal adversarial patterns.
Following [36], we evaluate the performance of faster r-
cnn using 2 network architectures (i.e., VGG-16 [31] and
ResNet-101[9]) which are either trained on the PascalVOC-
2007 trainval, or on the combined set of PascalVOC-
2007 trainval and PascalVOC-2012 trainval. We
denote these models as FR-VGG16-07, FR-RES101-07,
FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712.
Parameters setting. We set λ1 = 1.0 and λ2 = 0.01 in
Eq. 6 as initialization. For generating universal adversarial
patterns, we set iters = 100 and the maximum iteration
itermax = 2000 in Algorithm 1.
Evaluation Metric. For faster r-cnn, we set the threshold
of NMS as 0.3 and the confidence threshold as 0.5 (instead
of the default value 0.8). Even though IoU is used for stan-
dard evaluation of object detection, we do not use this met-
ric here since our focus is whether the detector hits or misses
the true label of the attacked instance. To this end, we pro-
pose a new metric for targeted attack, precision p0.5, to mea-
sure the probability of whether the detector can hit the true
category:
p0.5 =
∑
v∼V,b∼B,s∼S
{
C(x)
x∈X
= y, C(xˆ)
xˆ∈Xˆ
= y
}
|X | , (7)
where x is the original instance and xˆ denotes the perturbed
instance. V,L,S denote the sets of camera viewpoints,
brightness and scenes, respectively; C is the prediction of
detector and y is the groundtruth label.
5.2. Virtual Scene Experiment
Human Model and Pattern Schemes. We select human
models in AttackScenes with different poses (i.e., stand-
ing, walking and sitting) as the attacking target. 6 differ-
ent schemes (Fig. 4) are used under the material constraint
(Sec. 3.2) for experimental comparison.
In the virtual scene experiment, 1080 (20× 3× 18) im-
ages are rendered for each pattern scheme. Without loss
of generality, we choose “dog” and “bird” as target labels
to fool detectors in our experiment. We use 6 different
pattern schemes (i.e., Original/Naive/Natural/3-Patterns/7-
Patterns/8-Patterns schemes as illustrated in Fig. 4) for val-
idating the efficacy of the propose UPC.
As shown in Table 2, we find that the attack strength is
generally weaker in darker environments. This can be at-
tributed to the fact that the adversarial patterns are badly
Table 2. Average precision p0.5 in virtual scene experiments after
attacking faster r-cnn. Note that p0.5 is averaged over all view-
points of each pattern scheme under 3 brightness conditions.
Network FR-VGG16-0712 FR-RES101-0712
Schemes Standing StandingL1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop)
Original 0.97 0.97 1.0 0.98 (-) 0.99 0.99 1.0 0.99 (-)
Naive 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.97 (0.01) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 (0.0)
Natural 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.96 (0.02) 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 (0.02)
3-Patterns 0.64 0.36 0.18 0.39 (0.59) 0.73 0.69 0.70 0.69 (0.30)
7-Patterns 0.55 0.33 0.22 0.37 (0.61) 0.51 0.48 0.64 0.54 (0.45)
8-Patterns 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.07 (0.91) 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11 (0.88)
Schemes Walking WalkingL1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop)
Original 0.93 0.94 0.99 0.95 (-) 0.98 0.99 1.0 0.99 (-)
Naive 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.94 (0.01) 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 (0.01)
Natural 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.93 (0.02) 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 (0.01)
3-Patterns 0.37 0.26 0.16 0.26 (0.69) 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.48 (0.51)
7-Patterns 0.28 0.25 0.16 0.23 (0.72) 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.33 (0.66)
8-Patterns 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.04 (0.91) 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 (0.93)
Schemes Sitting SittingL1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop)
Original 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.98 (-) 1.0 0.99 0.99 0.99 (-)
Naive 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.94 (0.04) 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.93 (0.06)
Natural 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.95 (0.03) 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 (0.01)
3-Patterns 0.83 0.64 0.63 0.70 (0.28) 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.77 (0.22)
7-Patterns 0.83 0.77 0.63 0.74 (0.24) 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.78 (0.21)
8-Patterns 0.60 0.47 0.32 0.46 (0.52) 0.49 0.57 0.62 0.56 (0.43)
Table 3. Performance comparison with prior arts of physical at-
tacks under different settings. Note that p0.5 is averaged over all
viewpoints of 8-pattern scheme.
Network FR-VGG16-0712
Pose Standing Walking Sitting
UPCrc(ours) 0.07 (0.91) 0.04 (0.91) 0.46 (0.52)
UPCr(ours) 0.65 (0.32) 0.33 (0.62) 0.76 (0.22)
CLSrc(ours) 0.17 (0.80) 0.06 (0.89) 0.58 (0.44)
SS [5] 0.69 (0.28) 0.39 (0.56) 0.78 (0.20)
ERP 2 [8] 0.84 (0.13) 0.48 (0.47) 0.87 (0.11)
Network FR-RES101-0712
Pose Standing Walking Sitting
UPCrc(ours) 0.11 (0.88) 0.06 (0.93) 0.56 (0.43)
UPCr(ours) 0.73 (0.26) 0.42 (0.57) 0.86 (0.13)
CLSrc(ours) 0.30 (0.69) 0.16 (0.83) 0.65 (0.34)
SS [5] 0.83 (0.16) 0.47 (0.52) 0.88 (0.11)
ERP 2 [8] 0.79 (0.20) 0.44 (0.55) 0.91 (0.08)
captured when the level of brightness is low, which in-
duces low-quality attacks. Additionally, we observe that for
different human poses the average precision almost stays
at the same level (i.e., Standing: p0.5 drops from 0.98 to
0.97/0.96; Walking: p0.5 drops from 0.95 to 0.94/0.93;
Sitting: p0.5 drops from 0.98 to 0.94/0.95 using FR-
VGG16) via attacking Naive/Natural pattern scheme which
indicates that simply using naive camouflage or natural im-
ages as adversarial patterns is invalid for physical attacks.
By contrast, our method yields a distinct drop rate of
p0.5 for all 3 pattern schemes (i.e., 3/7/8-Pattern schemes),
among which 8-Pattern scheme observes the highest perfor-
mance drop (i.e., Standing: p0.5 drops from 0.98 to 0.07;
Walking: p0.5 drops from 0.95 to 0.04; Sitting: p0.5 drops
from 0.98 to 0.46 using FR-VGG16). It is no surprise to
observe such a phenomenon since using more generated
patterns for physical attack results in more surface area
occluded, which naturally leads to a higher fooling rate.
The detection result further shows our attack is invariant to
different viewing conditions (e.g., viewpoints, brightness).
detected as target labeldetected as person
(a)
(b)
Figure 5. Experimental results in (a) stationary testing and (b) mo-
tion testing. The camouflage is generated using FR-VGG16-0712.
Additionally, we also find that among these 3 poses “Sit-
ting” is the most difficult to attack since some patterns (e.g.,
pants or cloth patterns) are partially occluded or deformed
(see sampled images from Fig. 1 and Fig. 3).
We compare UPC with different existing physical attacks
under the following settings (Table 3): (1) both internal
deformations and external physical environments are sim-
ulated, i.e., Tc and Tr are used in Eq. 2, denoted as UPCrc;
(2) only external physical environments are modeled, i.e.,
Tr is used in Eq. 2, denoted as UPCr. (3) only attack the
classification head, i.e., Lcls is used to generate patterns,
denoted as CLSrc; (4) ShapeShifter [5], i.e., only use Tr in
Eq. 2 and attack against the classifier, denoted as SS, and
(5) we follow [33] by extendingRP 2 [8] for attacking faster
r-cnn, denoted as ERP 2. FR-RES101-0712/FR-VGG16-
0712 are used to generate the universal camouflage patterns
for these five scenarios.
From Table 3, the implications are two-fold. First,
we can see the drop rates of UPCrc and CLSrc are
significantly higher than those of UPCr, SS and ERP 2
(i.e., Standing: the average drop rate of p0.5 is 0.90/0.80
in UPCrc/CLSrc, while p0.5 drops 0.32/0.28/0.10 in
UPCr/SS/ERP
2 using FR-VGG16-0712). These quan-
titative results indicate that the proposed transformation
function Tc can effectively mimic the deformations (e.g.,
stretching) of complex objects. Second, UPCrc and UPCr
outperform CLSrc and SS, which suggest that the joint at-
tack paradigm (i.e., RPN and C&R attack) generally shows
stronger attacking strength than only attacking the classifi-
cation head [5]. In conclusion, all these experimental re-
sults demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed transforma-
tion term Tc as well as the joint attack paradigm for fooling
object detectors in the wild. Moreover, our proposed UPC
significantly outperforms existing methods [5, 8] by a large
margin, and thereby establish state-of-the-art for physical
adversarial attack on proposal-based object detectors.
5.3. Physical Environment Experiment
Following the setup of virtual scene experiments, we
stick the same camouflage pattern on different volunteers
(a) (b)
Figure 6. The precision p0.5 of detectors under different an-
gle/distance conditions. We note that high viewing angle or far
distance can make attacks less effective.
with diverse body sizes and garment styles. During the
physical experiment, we use Sonyα7r camera to take pho-
tos and record videos. Our physical experiments include
two parts: stationary testing and walking testing.
Stationary Testing. In the physical world, we choose 5
scenes including indoors and outdoors scenes under dif-
ferent lighting conditions. Similar to virtual scene ex-
periments, we take 18 photos of the attacked person for
each pattern scheme. To evaluate the robustness of our
method under different deformations, the person is required
to switch from 6 different poses (i.e., standing, sitting, leg
lifting, waving hands, fork waist, shaking head) during
photographing. We record the average precision p0.5 and
drop rates of FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712 under
three brightness conditions in Table 4. Similar to our find-
ings in Sec. 5.2, UPC expresses its superior attacking capa-
bility (e.g., For VGG16, Standing: p0.5 drops from 1.00 to
0.17, Sitting: p0.5 drops from 1.00 to 0.22, etc.) in the real
physical world compared to natural image patterns which
results in nearly zero drop rate in every posture.
As can be seen from Table 2 and Table 4, the behaviors
of detectors exhibit similar trends under different physical
conditions such as lighting conditions in both virtual scenes
and physical environments. Another noteworthy comment
is that the generated patterns from virtual scene experiments
demonstrate high transferability to the real physical world
(see Table 4). These facts indicate that our AttackScenes is
a suitable dataset to study physical attacks.
Motion Testing. To further demonstrate the efficacy of
UPC, we also test our algorithm on human motions. The
list of posture classes is the same as described in Sec. 5.2.
The video clips were obtained under different physical con-
ditions (e.g., different lighting conditions, scenes) while the
volunteers are walking towards the camera. Meanwhile,
they are randomly changing postures from the 6 classes as
mentioned above. A total of 3693 frames where 583, 377,
219, 713, 804 and 997 frames are collected under 5 dif-
ferent physical scenes so as to make this dataset diverse
and representative. And the detection precisions are 26%
(150/583), 21% (80/377), 17% (37/219), 34% (240/713),
15% (118/804) and 24% (240/997), respectively. Experi-
ments in all physical scenes have observed low detection
Table 4. Average precision p0.5 in stationary testing after attacking faster r-cnn. We test on a total of 6 different poses (i.e., standing, sitting,
leg lifting, waving hands, fork waist, shaking head).
Network FR-VGG16-0712 FR-RES101-0712
Schemes Standing Sitting Standing SittingL1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop)
Original 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-)
Random 1.0 0.94 1.0 0.98 (0.02) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0) 0.94 1.0 1.0 0.98 (0.02) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0)
3-Patterns 0.72 0.61 0.67 0.67 (0.33) 0.83 0.78 0.67 0.76 (0.24) 0.83 0.67 0.67 0.72 (0.28) 0.72 0.78 0.72 0.74 (0.26)
7-Patterns 0.67 0.56 0.56 0.59 (0.41) 0.61 0.50 0.50 0.54 (0.46) 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.59 (0.41) 0.61 0.67 0.50 0.59 (0.41)
8-Patterns 0.22 0.11 0.17 0.17 (0.83) 0.28 0.17 0.22 0.22 (0.78) 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.19 (0.81) 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.26 (0.74)
Schemes Fork Waist Leg Lifting Fork Waist Leg LiftingL1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop)
Original 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-)
Random 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0)
3-Patterns 0.78 0.72 0.67 0.72 (0.28) 0.72 0.78 0.72 0.74 (0.26) 0.83 0.72 0.72 0.76 (0.24) 0.67 0.78 0.67 0.71 (0.29)
7-Patterns 0.61 0.50 0.56 0.56 (0.44) 0.56 0.56 0.50 0.54 (0.46) 0.61 0.56 0.56 0.57 (0.43) 0.67 0.50 0.56 0.57 (0.43)
8-Patterns 0.28 0.17 0.17 0.20 (0.80) 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.26 (0.74) 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.24 (0.76) 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.30 (0.70)
Schemes Rasing Hands Shaking Head Rasing Hands Shaking HeadL1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop) L1 L2 L3 Avg (Drop)
Original 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (-)
Random 0.94 1.0 1.0 0.98 (0.02) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 (0.0)
3-Patterns 0.89 0.78 0.83 0.83 (0.17) 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.74 (0.26) 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.85 (0.15) 0.72 0.78 0.78 0.76 (0.24)
7-Patterns 0.72 0.61 0.61 0.65 (0.35) 0.61 0.61 0.56 0.59 (0.41) 0.89 0.61 0.56 0.69 (0.31) 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.57 (0.43)
8-Patterns 0.39 0.39 0.28 0.35 (0.65) 0.22 0.28 0.11 0.20 (0.80) 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.35 (0.65) 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.20 (0.80)
detected as others undetecteddetected as car
Figure 7. The results of attacking Volvo XC60 (top row) and
Volkswagen Tiguan (bottom row). The generated camouflage
patterns fool detectors to misrecognize the car as bird or person.
rates, which further confirms the effectiveness of UPC. The
detection results of some sampled frames are shown in
Fig. 5(b), where people are detected as “dog”.
We find this attack is much more effective under brighter
conditions. This phenomenon coincides with previous ob-
servations in virtual scene studies (Sec. 5.2), and also fur-
ther justify the potential value of AttackScenes. More-
over, we find that blurred camouflage patterns during mo-
tion make UPC less effective, which lead to higher detection
accuracy.
We also plot the relationship between the detection preci-
sion vs. angle/distance under 8-Pattern schemes as in Fig. 6.
It can be concluded that when the absolute value of the an-
gle/distance between the person and the camera becomes
larger, camouflage patterns are captured with lower quality
and thus hampering the attacks.
5.4. Transferability Experiment
We generate camouflage patterns from one architecture
to attack other models. In our experiment, FR-VGG16-
0712 and FR-RES101-0712 are used to compute cam-
ouflage patterns. We introduce ResNet-50, ResNet-152
and MobileNet [10] based faster r-cnn which are trained
Table 5. Average precision p0.5 in transferability testing. First
seven rows show the results of cross-training transfer testing, and
rest five rows display the cross-network transfer’s results (bold in
“Network” column).
Network Original FR-VGG16-0712 FR-RES101-0712Average (Drop) Average (Drop)
FR-VGG16-0712 0.95 0.04 (0.91) 0.10 (0.85)
FR-RES101-0712 0.99 0.78 (0.21) 0.06 (0.93)
FR-VGG16-07 0.95 0.08 (0.87) 0.11 (0.84)
FR-RES101-07 0.99 0.51 (0.48) 0.10 (0.89)
FR-RES50-14 1.0 0.85 (0.15) 0.78 (0.22)
FR-RES152-14 1.0 0.62 (0.38) 0.43 (0.57)
FR-MN-14 0.99 0.51 (0.48) 0.25 (0.74)
RFCN-RES101-07 0.98 0.64 (0.34) 0.41 (0.57)
SSD-VGG16-0712 0.75 0.13 (0.62) 0.16 (0.59)
Yolov2-14 1.0 0.59 (0.41) 0.38 (0.62)
Yolov3-14 1.0 0.69 (0.31) 0.71 (0.29)
Retina-14 1.0 0.72 (0.31) 0.49 (0.51)
on MS-COCO2014 [20] dataset as black-box attack mod-
els. Other architecture models including R-FCN (ResNet-
101) [6], SSD (VGG-16) [21], Yolov2 [26], Yolov3 [27]
and RetinaNet [19] are considered in our transferability
experiments. Eight models are publicly available, and
we denote them as FR-RES50-14, FR-RES152-14, FR-
MN-14, RFCN-RES101-07, SSD-VGG16-0712, Yolov2-
14, Yolov3-14 and Retina-14. The confidence threshold of
all black-box models is set as 0.5 for evaluation.
The following 2 transfer experiments are conducted:
(1) Cross-Training Transfer. The transferability between
source and attacked models have the same architecture but
are trained on different datasets (e.g., using the pattern gen-
erated from FR-VGG16-0712 to attack FR-VGG16-07); (2)
Cross-Network Transfer. The transferability through dif-
ferent network structures (e.g., using the pattern computed
from FR-VGG16-0712 to attack Yolov3).
During the transfer experiments, virtual walking humans
with 8-Patterns scheme (see Fig. 4) are used to evaluate the
transferability under black-box attacks. The transfer per-
formances are illustrated in Table 5. The original pattern
scheme is used to calculate the baseline precision of each
CarCat
w/ constraint w/o constraint
BoatCatCar BoatCatCar
Figure 8. Generated camouflage patterns are semantically
meaningful. Even for unconstrained patterns, human observer can
relate the generated camouflage patterns to the targeted label.
model (denoted as “Original” in Table 5). We observe that
the precisions of all detectors have dropped, which means
the generated patterns exhibits well transferability and gen-
erality across different models and datasets.
5.5. Generalization to Other Categories
To demonstrate the generalization of UPC, we construct
camouflage patterns by untargeted attacks to fool the “car”
category (i.e., rigid but non-planar object). We use Volvo
XC60 (champagne) and Volkswagen Tiguan (white) as the
attacking target in the physical world. The pattern will be
regarded as car paintings by human observers. In order to
not affect driving, we restrict the camouflage coverage re-
gions to exclude windows, lightings, and tires. We collect
120 photos which includes different distances (8 ∼ 12m)
and angles (0 ∼ 45◦) in 4 different environments. The video
is recorded simultaneously at various angles (0 ∼ 45◦).
Our results show 24% (29/120) images and 31% (140/453)
frames are detected as “car” correctly, which verifies the ef-
ficacy of UPC. Qualitative examples are shown in Fig. 7.
6. Discussion
Abstract Semantic Patterns. A side finding is that the
generated patterns without semantic constraint also exhibit
semantic meanings. For instance, the camouflage pattern
can be imagined as an abstract object of the target label by
human observers (Fig. 8). This observation suggest that
human and machine classification of adversarial images are
robustly related as suggested in [38].
Defense method evaluation. Our collected dataset, At-
tackScenes, can also be used for accessing the effectiveness
of defense methods against physical attacks. We hope this
dataset can benefit future research in this direction.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the problem of physical attacks
on object detectors. Specifically, we propose UPC to gen-
erate universal camouflage patterns which hide a category
of objects from being detected or to misdetect objects as
the target label by state-of-the-art object detectors. In ad-
dition, we present the first standardized benchmark dataset,
AttackScenes, to simulate the real 3D world in controllable
and reproducible environments. This dataset can be used
for accessing the performance of physical-world attacks at
a fair standard. Our study shows that the learned univer-
sal camouflage patterns not only mislead object detectors in
the virtual environment, i.e., AttackScenes, but also attack
detectors successfully in the real world.
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A. Experiments on Virtual Scenes
In this section, we provide more qualitative results of FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712 in the synthesized virtual
environments. These results are shown in Figure 10. We also show the results of targeting other categories in Figure 11.
Figure 9. More qualitative results under different attack settings in virtual experiments. Each column uses same physical conditions
(i.e., lighting, viewpoints, environment, etc.). The camouflage patterns generated from UPCrc achieve the most superior performance and
visually similar to natural image, which can be regarded as pattern designs on human accessories.
Figure 10. More qualitative results of FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712 on virtual environment. Each row set different virtual
environments with the same viewpoint of camera, and each column uses different lighting condition.
Figure 11. More qualitative results of targeting other categories. Each row applies different patterns (i.e., boat/car/cat/horse), and
captured in different viewpoints and background environments.
B. Experiments in Physical Environments
In Figure 12, we provide more qualitative results of FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712 in physical environment. In
addition, videos of this experiment is available in the supplemental files.
Figure 12. More qualitative results of FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712 on in physical environment. These universal camou-
flage patterns are generated using FR-VGG16-0712 and FR-RES101-0712, respectively. Each row applies different pattern schemes (i.e.,
3/7/8-Pattern schemes), and captured in different viewpoints and background environments.
C. Generalization to Other Categories
In this section, we show some qualitative results of UPC on fooling the “car” category in both virtual scenes and physical
world. Video of this experiment is available in the supplemental files.
Figure 13. More qualitative results of attacking the “car” category in virtual scenes. We use two different car models (red car in top
three rows and white car in bottom three rows) to evaluate the generalizablity of UPC.
Figure 14. More experimental results of fooling the “car” category in physical world. We attack two different cars, i.e., Volvo XC60
and Volkswagen Tiguan.
